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Abstract: 
Is there such a thing as a philosophical method? It seems that there 
are as many philosophical methods as there are philosophies.  A 
method is any procedure employed to achieve a certain aim. So, 
before  proposing  a  method,  we  have  to  tackle  the  delicate 
question:  “what  is  the  aim  of  philosophy?”.  At  the  origin  of 
philosophy, there is a questioning about the world. The worldview 
approach  developed  by  Leo  Apostel  (Apostel,  Van  der  Veken 
1991)  elegantly  explicit  those  fundamental  questions.  As  we 
answer  them,  we  come  up  with  a  worldview.  Using  this 
framework,  this  paper  consider  answering  this  enduring 
philosophical agenda as the primary aim of philosophy. However, 
we  argue  that  philosophical  worldviews constitute  a  particular 
class of possible worldviews. With the help of three analogies, we 
give guidelines to construct such worldviews. The next step is to 
compare the relative strength of philosophical worldviews. Precise 
evaluation  standards  to  compare  and  confront  worldviews  are 
proposed.  Some  problems  for  worldview  diffusion  are  then 
expounded. We close with basic hypotheses to build an integrative 
philosophical worldview. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Takeover of science over philosophy 
Since the development of modern science, we have to recognize that science has been taking over 
more and more issues from philosophy. For example, classical philosophical problems about the 
mind,  time,  space,  or  the  cosmos  are  now  investigated  by  scientific  means.  How  should 
philosophers react to this? They should be delighted, because it means that we are getting more 
precise arguments and insights in our search for understanding the world. 
However, that does not mean that philosophy has lost its place, but rather that it has to redefine its 
scope and also its relationship to science. Philosophy could take the opportunity to embrace all this 
new knowledge with its new philosophical consequences. Partly because of this takeover, today's 
philosophy collapsed in two main traditions, with different drawbacks that we will quickly examine. 
1.2 Philosophical trends 
Paul Ricoeur directed a survey of the "main trends of philosophy" (Ricoeur 1979). Although this 
dates back more than twenty-five years,  it is interesting to look at the three main trends he did 
distinguish. 
(1) Philosophy is a Weltanschauung (worldview) 
(a) Marxism
(b) derivatives from hegelianism 
(c) philosophies of scientists calling for synthesis of cosmology and anthropology 
(d) Aristotelian-thomist synthesis. 
(2) English and American analytic philosophy 
(3) Subjectivity and beyond. Philosophy's responsibility is considered to be the taking into 
account of other forms of experience than objective knowledge. (young Hegel, Kierkegaard, 
young  Marx,  and  certain  developments  of  phenomenology.)  This  third  trend  could 
correspond to what is often called "continental philosophy". 
Philosophy today seems to show that analytic (2) and continental philosophies (3) are the two main 
trends. However, even if analytical philosophy did bring powerful methods of analysis and critic 
into  philosophy,  it  still  lacks  a  general  guideline,  and a  unifying  idea.  And the  use  of  logical 
methods  can  not  be  such  an  idea.  On  the  other  hand,  continental  philosophy  appears  like  a 
stimulating intellectual approach. But it faces even greater problems than analytic philosophy; the 
first one being probably its lack of methodology; see e.g. (Shackel 2005). 
It is noteworthy that we can draw a parallel between these trends and the distinction elaborated by 
Broad  (1924)  between  speculative  philosophy and  critical  philosophy. Speculative  philosophy 
corresponds to philosophy as a worldview (1),  and critical  philosophy can take two forms,  the 
analytic (2) or continental (3) philosophy. 
Analytic  philosophy really  needs  something  more  than  pure  analysis;  certainly  a  synoptic  and 
synthetic point of view. Worldview construction, or speculative philosophy can precisely fulfil this 
need.  This  kind  of  philosophy  could  also  be  called,  as  the  faithful  companion  to  analytic 
philosophy, synthetic philosophy -although being different from Spencer's philosophy. 
Another trend that we should add is the specialization of philosophical problems, together with an 
explosion of the agenda. This is exemplified by the proliferation of second-order problems, or the 
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"philosophies of x"; where x is often a scientific discipline, but can be almost any discipline. These 
specialised  philosophies  are  certainly  very  useful,  enlightening  their  specific  domain;  but  their 
relation with fundamental questions about the whole is becoming more and more difficult to link 
up. 
1.3 Problems 
We're facing two main problems. The first problem is related to the method of philosophy. Since a 
method is any procedure employed to attain a certain aim, even before trying to build a method, we 
must face the highly debated question: What is the aim of philosophy? 
A fuzzy answer to that question is to say that it is the quest to understand humankind and the world 
it is living in. However, for the most important questions, this enterprise overlaps with science and 
with religion. We do not aim to focus on this problem here. Let us just say that philosophy, science 
and religion have this common quest of understanding (see e.g. (Russell 1988)), and they can build 
more or less strong relationships to pursue it. In section 3, we define the worldview agenda as being 
the central aim of philosophy. 
As soon as we quit the scientific method(s), the problem of the philosophical method can be stated 
in the following way: "If philosophical theories are all irrefutable, how can we ever distinguish  
between true and false philosophical theories?" (Popper 1958, 266). That is, how can we make 
rational, persuading and useful speculations? 
In  our  framework  this  second problem can be formulated  as:  how can we build  philosophical  
worldviews? This paper aims to answer this question, by providing a method, or at  least some 
guidelines for such a construction. The following questions also naturally arise. What criteria could 
we use for saying that such or such worldview is better than another? How can we compare the 
strengths and weaknesses of different worldviews? How can we best diffuse them? 
We will first present an enduring philosophical agenda in section 3. Then with the help of three 
analogies, we will give some guidelines to construct philosophical worldviews (section 4). We will 
then examine how we can compare and confront worldviews (section 5) and also some problems for 
their diffusion (section 5.3). The last section 6 will go one step further and propose some basic 
hypotheses to build such an integrative worldview. But first we will start with some remarks about 
the philosophical method (section 2). 
2 The philosophical method 
There seems to be as many philosophical methods as there are different philosophies (Passmore 
1967). For Plato or Hegel the philosophical method is the dialectic; for Bergson it is the intuition; 
for  Wittgenstein  it  is  uncovering  nonsense;  for  Schlick  it  is  clarification;  for  Husserl  the 
phenomenological description; for Hume it is following the methods of experimental inquiry, and 
for Spinoza applying the methods of geometry, etc... The diversity of methods thus tends to obscure 
the task of philosophy. 
Why is it so? As Körner (1969, 20) suggests, probably because when philosophers find a fruitful 
method, they tend to extend it, and claim that their method is the only proper method of philosophy. 
They often even define philosophy by the use of that method. Since a particular author's philosophy 
equals a particular philosophical  method,  it  is very difficult  to try to make an overview of  the 
philosophical method. 
However,  specific  problems  such  as  "What  is  philosophy?  What  is  its  method,  function,  and 
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scope?"  have  been  revived  and  explicitly  studied  under  the  label  of  “metaphilosophy”.  The 
distinction  between metaphilosophy and philosophy can be made in  terms of  problem domain, 
however in general there is no such thing as a meta-theory that one could apply to any philosophy, 
without having itself philosophical presuppositions. 
This paper is mainly inspired on the work of five important (meta)philosophers: Nicholas Rescher, 
Karl  Popper,  Charlie  Dunbar  Broad,  and Leo Apostel  with  Jan Van der  Veken.  We will  now 
introduce their main contributions to this debate. 
2.1 Rescher 
Nicholas Rescher (Rescher 2001, chap3) clarified why the question of the aim of philosophy is so 
important.  The  set  of  questions  that  a  philosopher  aims  to  tackle  is  called  the  "philosophical 
agenda".  Defining this agenda is  strongly related to the kind of philosophy that  is  going to be 
undertaken. Thus, the agenda is a highly controversial topic in philosophy. This is an exceptional 
case in the landscape of intellectual disciplines. Most disciplines know clearly what their aims are, 
i.e. what they would like to see achieved. 
We  can  illustrate  this  situation  with  three  examples  in  the  recent  history  of  philosophy,  each 
proposing a reduction of the agenda. Logical positivism tried to reduce the agenda of philosophy to 
nil; analytical philosophy reduced it to the study of language; and deconstructionism reduced it to 
the study of literature. However, we have today an explosion of the agenda of philosophy, with 
topics as diverse as the philosophy of sport or of humour. 
Although Rescher (2001) discuss in depth these metaphilosophical issues in his book, he does not 
himself offer any explicit agenda. 
2.2 Popper 
Karl Popper is famous for his criterion of "falsifiability" to distinguish between scientific and non-
scientific theories. But what did he say about the status of philosophy? We saw that in the last few 
pages of a paper entitled "On the Status of Science and of Metaphysics", Popper state the problem 
of philosophical theories in the following way: 
If  philosophical  theories  are  all  irrefutable,  how  can  we  ever  distinguish  between  true  and  false  
philosophical theories? (Popper 1958, 266). 
Popper then exposes his solution. He claims that a rational theory answers problems. Therefore, we 
have to analyse the link between a problem situation and the proposed solution. 
Now if we look upon a theory as a proposed solution to a set of problems, then the theory immediately 
lends itself  to  critical  discussion -even if  it  is  non-empirical  and irrefutable.  For  can  we now ask 
questions such as, Does it solve the problem? [...] Questions of this kind show that a critical discussion 
even of irrefutable theories may well be possible. (Popper 1958, 269).
2.3 Broad 
Broad  distinguished  three  kinds  of  philosophical  activities:  analysis,  synopsis,  and  synthesis. 
Analysis is the well-known study of concepts and their interrelations;  synopsis is "the deliberate 
attempt to view together aspects of human experience which are generally viewed apart, and the 
endeavour to see how they are inter-connected." (Broad 1958, 116); and the purpose of synthesis is 
“to supply a set of concepts and principles which shall cover satisfactorily all the various regions 
which are being viewed synoptically." (Broad 1958, 126). He emphasize the strong link between 
5
analysis and synopsis: 
Analysis and synopsis themselves may be present in very different degrees and proportions. Hume's 
work,  e.g.,  is  so  predominantly  analytic  that  it  might  be  denied  to  be  synoptic,  and Hegel's  is  so 
predominantly synoptic that it might be denied to be analytic. But I believe that both are always present, 
and that each involves some degree of the other. Lastly, there is a very high positive correlation between 
synopsis and synthesis. Synthesis presupposes synopsis, and extensive synopsis is generally made by 
persons whose main interest is in synthesis. (Broad 1947).
Broad also gives excellent examples of synopsis in different important philosophical problems such 
as sense-perception, mind-body and free-will. The clarity and rigour of his writings make them very 
worth reading (Broad 1924, 1947, 1958). 
2.4 Apostel 
Great philosophers are so because of their ambition to build systems of thought, that answer all 
philosophical questions. One of the last great attempts was made by Rudolf Carnap. Nowadays, 
Carnap is  almost  always  quoted in  order  to  be  bitterly  criticised  -and on very strong grounds. 
However, one of his students, Leo Apostel (1925-1995) kept the same ambition, the same grandeur, 
without  the naive and reductionistic  presuppositions of the Vienna Circle.  This  led him among 
others to create an interdisciplinary research group, The World View group, and to write a short 
book together with Jan Van der Veken (Apostel, Van der Veken 1991), which can be compared 
with the manifesto of the Wiener Kreis (Carnap et. al. 1929). The difference between the two is that 
the latter had a recognition it did not deserve, and the former deserves a recognition that it did not 
have. 
This work has the great merit to clarify the big questions of a worldview or a philosophy (we will 
clarify the difference between worldview and philosophy shortly [3.1; 4.1]). Let us elaborate this 
worldview agenda in more details. 
3 The worldview agenda 
3.1 What is a worldview? 
In its  broadest  sense,  when we talk about "a philosophy" we refer in fact to a worldview. For 
example,  when we speak about  the philosophy of  the  Inuit  or  the  Maya.  The term worldview 
(Weltanschauung in German) has a long and fascinating history going back to Kant (see (Naugle 
2002) for an history of the concept). The term has been and is used not only in philosophy, but also 
among  others  in  theology,  anthropology,  or  in  education.  Wolter  (1989)  summarized  the 
relationships between worldview and philosophy. With the definition that will follow, our position 
tends towards what he calls "worldview crowns philosophy", that is, constructing a worldview is the 
highest manifestation of philosophy. 
The term “worldview” is often used to emphasize a personal and historical point of view. In this 
sense, the term can have a negative connotation for the philosopher, because philosophy generally 
claims universal validity, as it has a clear association with rational thought. We will see [4.1] that it 
is possible to define the class of "philosophical worldviews", as rooted in rationality and thus also 
aiming at a kind of universal validity. 
The next section will constitute our precise definition of what a worldview is. It offers at the same 
time a very general and sound philosophical agenda. With Rescher (2001, 33), we can distinguish 
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between the procedural agenda, which in this paper consists of the  worldview questions; and the 
substantive agenda, which consists of the proposed answers to the questions, and that we will call 
the  worldview  components.  The  components  articulated  together  form  a  worldview,  that  is,  a 
coherent collection of concepts that must allow us “to construct a global image of the world, and in 
this way to understand as many elements of our experience as possible." (Apostel, Van der Veken 
1991, 17). 
3.2 The fundamental questions
Here follow the six worldview questions. These questions corresponds to the “big”, “eternal”, or 
“age-old”  philosophical  questions.  The choice  of  the  questions is  motivated  in  more  details  in 
(Apostel,  Van der Veken 1991); also reformulated in (Heylighen 2000). We build on those two 
references for what follows. The traditional philosophical domains can be seen as answering these 
questions, presented below.
Question Philosophical Domain 
1. What is? Ontology (model of the present) 
2. Where does it all come from? Explanation (model of the past) 
3. Where are we going? Prediction (model of the future) 
4. What is good and what is evil? Axiology (theory of values) 
5. How should we act? Praxiology (theory of actions) 
6. What is true and what is false? Epistemology (theory of knowledge) 
Table: Summary of the worldview questions, with their corresponding traditional philosophical domain. 
The first question is the question of ontology; or a model of reality itself. It can be typified with the 
question "What is?". It  encompasses questions like, What is the nature of our world? How is it 
structured and how does it function? Why is there something rather than nothing? etc... 
The second question explains the first component. Why is the world the way it is, and not different? 
What kind of global explanatory principles can we put forward? How did the Universe originate? 
Where does it all come from? Answers to these questions should be able to explain how and why 
such or such phenomena arose. 
The third question is complementary to the second one. Instead of focusing on the past, it focuses 
on the future.  Where are we going to? What will be the fate of life and the Universe? It is about 
futurology, because the component should give us a list  of  possible  futures,  with more or less 
probable developments. But the fact that there remain uncertainties, i.e. that there is more than one 
outcome possible, leave us with choices to make. Which alternative should we promote, and which 
one should we avoid? For this, we need values. 
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This brings us to the fourth question. How do we evaluate global reality? What should we strive 
for? What is good and what is evil? What is the meaning of life? Axiology traditionally deals with 
those questions, including morality, ethics, and aesthetics. The component should give us a sense of 
purpose, a direction, a set of goals to guide our actions. 
The fifth question is about the theory of action, or praxiology. How should we act? What are the 
general  principles  according  to  which  we  should  organise  our  actions?  It  would  help  us  to 
implement plans of action, according to our values, in order to solve practical problems. It is often 
said that a philosophy is of no use because it is too far from reality, that it does not give any precise 
answer to concrete questions, this is often true. A praxiology correctly developed should fill this 
gap. 
The sixth question is about the theory of knowledge (epistemology). How are we to construct our 
image of this world in such a way that we can come up with answers to (1), (2) and (3)? How can 
we acquire knowledge? In its most general term, it is the question "what is true and what is false?", 
which is one of the main issues of logic. We thus could also relate to this component the question of 
language; what language should we use for our purposes of knowledge acquisition, and what are its 
limitations? 
There is in fact a seventh question, which is a meta-question, asking Where do we start in order to  
answer those questions?. It invites us to seek for the partial answers that we can propose to these 
questions.  A natural  way to start  is  to  study worldviews that  appeared in the history of  ideas, 
preferably being aware of the tradition of thought, and its more or less hidden assumptions. 
3.3 Necessity to have a worldview
In the section “The need for philosophy: humans as homo quaerens” Rescher (2001, 6-10) already 
argued in details from an evolutionary point of view that humans' strength is in their capacity to 
acquire and use knowledge of the world. “We are neither numerous and prolific (like the ant and the 
termite),  nor  tough  and  aggressive  (like  the  shark).  Weak  and  vulnerable  creatures,  we  are 
constrained to make our evolutionary way in the world by the use of brainpower.” (Rescher 2001, 
p7). This leads to the practical need to have more knowledge, to be able to understand and thus 
predict features of our world. There is accordingly a need to have a worldview and to improve it.
There are also psychological and sociological needs for a good worldview. Sociological research 
seems to indicate that the feelings of insecurity and distrust are stronger among the people who least 
profess  belief  in  a  religious  or  philosophical  worldview  (Elchardus,  1998).  Psychologists 
researching life satisfaction, on the other hand, have found that having such beliefs increases well- 
being, by providing a sense of life meaning, feelings of hope and trust, a long-term perspective on 
life's woes, and a sense of belonging to a larger whole (Myers, 1993). If philosophy does not answer 
those  questions,  others  realms of  our  culture  will  take  advantage of  the  situation,  and provide 
answers. These are principally religions, or, much more dangerously, cults, extremist ideologies or 
fundamentalist interpretations of religion spreading irrational beliefs. 
We all need a certain worldview, even if it is unconscious, to interact in our world. There is a 
practical need to have at least an implicit and very naive answer for each questions. 
In the next section, we will argue that even such a simple entity as a bacterium needs to have a kind 
of worldview to interact meaningfully with its environment. Indeed, any living being is trying to 
survive, and has thus to deal with disturbances. This dynamic can be understood more precisely by 
introducing a cybernetic model of a worldview. 
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3.4 A cybernetic model of a worldview 
We  reproduced  below  the  "Worldview  of  an  individual  in  a  cybernetic  system"  diagram  of 
Heylighen (2000). This cybernetic approach will give us a first suggestion of how the different 
worldview components dynamically interrelate. 
Worldview of an individual in a cybernetic. Heylighen (2000). 
“The apparently disconnected components of a worldview can in fact be understood as part of an encompassing scheme 
describing the interaction between a system or self and the world or environment. In cybernetics an autonomous system 
or agent is conceptualized as a control system, which tries to achieve its goals or values by initiating the right actions  
that compensate for the disturbances produced by the environment. For that, it needs to perceive or get information 
about the effects of its actions and the effects of the events happening in the world. More specifically,  it  needs to 
understand how particular events (past) cause other events (future), that is to say it needs to have a model that allows it 
to explain and anticipate events. The first six components of a worldview cover all the fundamental aspects of this 
control scheme, as illustrated in the following figure. Worldview components (in [large font]) are written above the 
corresponding control scheme components.”
Reproduced with the kind permission of Francis Heylighen. 
What is striking when one looks carefully at this diagram is the centrality of the value component. 
The information we seek and the actions we do ultimately depends on our values. 
Let  us  also  note  that  the  seventh  component  does  not  appear  here,  since  it  is  a  meta-level 
component. The components (1), (2), (3) could also be seen in the individual, since a worldview is 
from an individual. 
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3.5 Examples of different worldviews 
We will now take four examples of four very different worldviews, by considering a scientific and a 
religious worldview but also the worldview of a bacterium, and of a society.  The scientific and 
religious  worldviews  we  describe  are  caricatured.  The  purpose  is  not  to  be  accurate  in  the 
worldview description, but rather to show how it functions. 
(a) scientific (b) religious (c) bacterium (d) society 
1. Ontology Materialism, no 
God. 
Dualism matter-
mind. 
What it senses at 
present. 
Shared cultural 
ontology. 
2. Explanation Scientific models 
of the Universe, its 
evolution. 
God. Answers in 
sacred writings. 
A kind of memory. 
(Which can be the 
biochemical state of 
the bacterium.) 
Explanation for the 
present society. 
3. Prediction Predictive models 
of our world. 
Promise of a life 
after death. 
Genetically-based 
anticipation system. 
Political plans, 
forecasting. 
4. Axiology Very vague. Only 
values for scientific 
inquiry. 
Concrete and 
fixed values from 
the writings. (e.g. 
Ten 
Commandments) 
Mainly genetically 
determined: Find 
food; reproduce. 
Utopia, political 
and economical 
values. 
5. Praxiology No guide for 
action. 
Some precise and 
concrete actions 
proposed. 
Move; eat and 
digest. 
Political actions, 
normal people 
actions. 
6. Epistemology Interaction between 
theory and 
observation to 
build components 
1, 2, 3. 
Knowledge 
comes primarily 
from the writings. 
Some basic 
perceptions. 
Information comes 
from media and 
education. 
It might be surprising that it is indeed possible to analyse the actions and interactions of a bacterium 
with the worldview model. Speaking about the worldview of a society may also seem rather far-
fetched, if we do not use the metaphor of the society as an organism. Those two extreme examples 
have however the benefits to show us the limits of the worldview concept. For we can wonder, what 
is  the  difference  between  a  worldview  and  a  model?  A  possible  answer  is  that  a  worldview 
encompasses everything that is important to an individual, whereas a model describes a specific 
phenomena. 
The "worldview of a society" example suggests that, even if a worldview is ultimately carried by an 
individual, we should also not forget to analyse higher levels of systems or organizations with the 
relevant concepts at that level. Of course, this higher analysis has to be  in fine  reintegrated in a 
10
worldview of an individual. 
This approach in terms of worldviews thus intricately links abstracts philosophical questions, with 
an individual's personal experience. We do not simply seek the most perfect model of the world; we 
also want it embodied in individuals, thus providing rules to live meaningfully. 
3.6 Evolution of questions and components
It could be objected that the worldview questions and components evolve. In how far have these 
questions changed over time? 
We can (nay, we must) discuss how those questions can be answered - or failing that, dissolved-; 
but it is difficult to dismiss those questions as irrelevant. This philosophical agenda is arguably 
enduring. The first reason is, as we have previously argued [3.3], that there is a necessity to have a 
worldview for  an  individual  to  interact  in  his  world,  even for  a  very  simple  individual  like  a 
bacterium. The second reason is that questions have been tackled again and again through the ages. 
Indeed, age-old philosophical questions are or can all be easily related to the worldview questions. 
For example  the question of philosophy according to Kant, "What is Man?", and the two related 
"what is nature?", "what is the relation of man in nature?" are just vaguer and shorter ways for 
asking for a worldview. 
It seems natural and obvious that there is an ever ongoing evolution of the worldview components. 
It is part of philosophy's task to constantly re-adapt a worldview to new knowledge and discoveries, 
to new things happening in the world. Together with the content of the worldview components, the 
precise intellectual context of an epoch will make the formulation of the problems related to the 
worldview questions change. 
Those seven questions can be seen as a compass for any philosopher. Answering (at least) these 
questions is  not just  an option;  it  is  the fundamental  role  of the philosopher.  But  how can we 
proceed  to  answer  the  questions,  in  the  best  possible  way?  What  are  the  best  philosophical 
worldviews, and how can we construct them? 
4 Analogies for philosophical worldviews 
4.1 The class of philosophical worldviews. 
The worldview questions as we have defined them are nothing but the most classical and arguably, 
most important philosophical problems. How we will answer them will determine if we are doing 
philosophy, and what kind of philosophy we are doing. A common denominator to all the various 
definitions of philosophy is that it is a rational inquiry. We thus propose to define  philosophical  
worldviews as the class of rational worldviews. 
A corollary of this approach is that philosophy can be defined as either worldview construction 
(speculative philosophy) or worldview criticism (critical philosophy). Philosophy, like science, is 
neither pure speculation, nor pure criticism; it is speculation controlled not by experiments, but by 
criticism. There is a tension between the need for a systematic,  integrative philosophy, and the 
rational, critical and sceptical attitude. 
The criterion of rationality alone for qualifying the philosophical reasoning is minimal. We urge to 
add  the  values  of  open  discussion  and  scientific  attitude (Bahm  1979,  62-63).  Also,  one 
fundamental  criterion  emphasised by Broad is  synopsis.  But  the  synopsis  has  to  be  the widest 
possible one, e.g. in time and space scales. This requirement of broad synopsis recalls the fourth 
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principle of Descartes' (1637)  Discourse on the Method: "in every case to make enumerations so 
complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted." 
For example to the question, "where does it all come from?", we do not expect an answer of the 
kind: "from my mother's belly". We mean, "where does our Universe come from?". In the same 
way, the philosopher should seek values that would be valid for everyone (even if one's theory of 
values is a relative one, then there is still the meta-principle of the relativity of values). Similar 
observations can be made about the other questions. 
Creating an ideology or a religion is also building a worldview. Without the criteria of rationality, 
open discussion and widest synopsis however, such a worldview would not be philosophical. 
How can  we  construct  philosophical  worldviews?  Of  course,  there  is  no  easy  way or  an  all-
purposes-ready-made recipe to do it. However, we can go further than the three fundamental criteria 
of a philosophical worldview we outlined. Intuitively, the best worldviews would also answer  all 
our questions, in a  coherent way. How can we formulate this intuition more concretely? That is 
what we will examine now, with the help of three analogies. To prevent any misunderstandings, I 
wish to emphasize that the following analogies, like any explicit analogies, are merely cognitive 
tools. For example, with the first analogy I do not intend to import all mathematical logic tools to 
the worldview approach. Some perspectives may be worth exploring, others not. 
4.2 Worldview questions as axioms
We propose to see the analogue of a worldview question as an axiom. A first consequence of this 
mathematical analogy is that every (hidden) assumptions has to be made clear and explicit. Thus a 
worldview is the analogue of a model of axioms. We use the term "model" in the model theoretic 
sense, i.e. not in the sense of a simplified representation. A model is a structure satisfying a set of 
axioms. And as it is often possible for a set of axioms to have different models, different possible 
worldviews are equally possible for the same worldview questions. 
But remember that our problem is: how can we reduce the number of possible worldviews? The 
intuitive answer is to keep only the worldviews answering all our questions, in a coherent manner. 
In our analogy, this corresponds to two fundamental properties of formal theories: completeness and 
coherence. 
Let us remember that a theory is  complete if and only if it contains either P or not-P for every 
sentence P in the language. In our analogy, a philosophical worldview should be complete in the 
sense that it should answer the six worldview questions. To clarify, we can state that the idea is here 
similar to the synthesis concept described by Broad, or the comprehensiveness criteria of (Rescher 
2001), or with the idea that philosophical systems "should be evaluated, however, on their capacity 
for maximal integration of the [worldview] fragments." (Aerts et al. 1994, 41). We mean that a 
"complete" worldview is suitable, in the sense of a worldview not excluding questions, even if some 
answers are still problematic or ad hoc. 
An interesting approach to achieve this is to generalize the method of Pascal’s wager (Pascal 1670), 
to answer all questions. Coincidentally (or not!) Kant  follows the same way of reasoning in his 
Critique of the Practical Reason (Kant 1788), with his concept of the "regulative principle of the 
pure reason". In the first  Critique of the Pure Reason (Kant 1781) he recognized that we can not 
answer metaphysical question definitely. He did not stop here, however. He still sought to answer 
all  fundamental  questions,  and  that's  why  he  is  a  great  philosopher.  He  thus  chose  a  more 
hypothetical approach, saying that freedom, immortality of soul and God's existence are postulates. 
This is fully developed in his second critique (Kant 1788). 
Let us now remember that a system is coherent if it is not possible to derive a contradiction from it. 
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One answer to one question should never be contradicted by another worldview component. Of 
course, in worldviews such contradictions are more or less ubiquitous. However, such incoherences 
could help us to focus the worldview building on dissipating them. Take for example the classical 
problem of theodicy. How can a God who is supposed to be benevolent and omnipotent allow the 
existence of evil in the world? Classical philosophers and theologians have worked hard to propose 
solutions  to  this  incoherence.  Rescher  (2001,  chap  7,9)  convincingly  argue  that  conceptual 
distinctions can play the role of resolving such incoherences and that we can see the whole history 
of philosophy as this apory-solving activity. 
We should however already be aware that the danger of emphasising coherence too much is to build 
an abstract system of concepts, very coherent, but that would be too far from reality. So, we should 
certainly add that coherence must not only be internal to the system, but also external, with "facts" 
or  "reality".  This  dynamic  is  similar  to  the  well  known mutual  feedback  between  theory  and 
experience in scientific enquiry. 
An important question naturally arises. Assuming that it is very difficult to build a worldview that is 
both coherent and complete, which of the two possibilities should we prefer? 
(i) an incomplete but coherent worldview 
(ii) a complete but incoherent worldview 
The scientific worldview typifies the first situation (i). The answers it gives to a model of the world 
(1),  an  explanation  (2)  and  predictions  (3)  are  very  coherent  and  with  some  epistemological 
additions, it can handle the questions of the theory of knowledge (6). Note however that coherence 
between different sciences is pretty hard to see achieve. But it is incomplete, in the sense that it does 
not answer problems of values (4) or actions (5). If we start with a very coherent worldview, we can 
then try to expand it to make it more complete, to answer new questions yet never tackled. The 
problem then faced is how can concepts developed for components (1), (2) and (3) be extended or 
made compatible with attempts for answering the worldview questions (4) and (5)? This might well 
be very difficult to achieve. 
The religious worldviews tend to be complete but incoherent (ii). They are most often criticized for 
their inconsistencies. Indeed, if they keep being traditional, they are very poor at components (1), 
(2),  (3),  (6).  However,  they do give values (4) and guidelines  actions (5).  Even guidelines for 
actions can be confusing. Is it not said in the Bible both “An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth” 
(Matthew, 5:38) and “If someone strikes you on the cheek, offer the other cheek as well” (Luke, 
6:29)? We have to acknowledge that many theologians do great efforts to achieve coherence, by 
working hard on interpreting the texts, and by including the results of modern science. And if the 
result is convincing, it is near what we would call a complete and coherent worldview. In this sense, 
this approach can be more appealing than a purely scientific worldview, which simply leaves very 
important questions unanswered. 
To conclude, we think that focusing first on completeness, on a synoptic view, makes much more 
sense than focusing on coherence. From a wide synopsis, we can start solving the contradictions, 
thus  going  towards  a  complete  and coherent  worldview.  However  the  concepts  used  by  some 
coherent worldview components can be so different of the one used by the others, that it makes the 
way to a complete worldview (to a synthesis) very difficult, if not impossible. 
I insist again that this is just an analogy. Let us therefore point out some of its limitations. I shall 
first emphasise that the worldview, contrary to a mathematical model in which there is no time 
variable,  does  not  have  to  be  fixed  for  ever.  It  must  be  kept  open  to  modifications  and 
improvements.  It  must  be  emphasised  that  the  analogue  of  axioms  here  are  questions,  not 
propositions.  The analogy thus does not  imply a  presupposition  of  foundationalism. Thus,  it  is 
foundational in the sense that the questions are fundamental, but there are no presuppositions for 
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how to answer them. Some might already have torn to pieces this paper, correctly objecting that the 
analogy breaks down because of the well-known limitation theorems, which states that no formal 
system containing at least Peano's axioms of elementary arithmetic can be coherent and complete. 
But  here we are seeking heuristics,  and this analogy gives  us  some clues about  what  an  ideal 
worldview should come close to.
4.3 Worldview questions as a system of equations 
Another interesting mathematical analogy is to compare the worldview questions with a system of 
equations.  The questions are related,  as are the equations in a system of equations. Hao Wang 
explicated  this  analogy  (Wang  1986,  210).  Solving  philosophical  problems  is  "comparable  to 
solving an intricate set of simultaneous equations which may have no solution at all or only relative 
solutions in the sense that we have often to choose between giving more weight to satisfying (more 
adequately) one equation or another." This suggests that we might have to give more weight to one 
component or another when answering the questions. Ideally, the philosopher should limit this bias, 
or at least be aware of it. 
This analogy also implicitly assumes that there exists a common language to the different equations. 
Thus, for the worldview questions, this would imply finding a coherent set of concepts relating 
consistently to each other in all the different components. 
4.4 Worldview questions as problems to solve. 
This  third  analogy  may  be  the  most  interesting  and  powerful  way  to  look  at  the  worldview 
questions.  Nicholas Rescher argued that the most understandable history of philosophy to write 
would be  one explicating the dialectic  of  problems  (or  questions)  and  answers  (Rescher  2001, 
chap2). Now, if we assume, for the sake of the analogy, that philosophy is problem-solving, then 
why not use the rich literature (e.g. the classical (Newell, Simon 1972; Polya 1957)) about this field 
to understand and tackle philosophical problems? 
A very clear way to approach the problem of building a philosophy is to view it precisely as a (big!) 
problem to solve. Newell, Simon and Polya work on general problem solving methods gave rise to 
the following sequence of steps: 
(1) Understand the problem 
(2) Conceive a plan 
(3) Execute the plan 
(4) Examine the solution 
In the case of building a philosophy, the problem is a very difficult one, because it is in fact the set 
of problems given by the worldview questions.  This approach perfectly fits Popper's  claim that 
“every rational theory, no matter whether scientific or philosophical, is rational in so far as it tries 
to solve certain problems. A theory is comprehensible and reasonable only in its relation to a given 
problem-situation,  and  it  can  be rationally  discussed  only by discussing this  relation.”  (Popper 
1958, 268- 269) [italics by Popper]. 
The  context  of  the  problem,  the  problem-situation,  is  thus  also  of  paramount  importance.  For 
example, a philosophical problem is always embedded in the ongoing debate confronting the most 
prominent philosophical positions. 
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5 Worldview confrontation and diffusion. 
We will now investigate more precisely how we can confront different worldviews. First, we argue 
that  philosophers  should  aim  at  a  unique  worldview  [5.1].  We  then  propose  some  evaluation 
standards to see how to confront different worldviews [5.2], and some considerations to take into 
account for worldview diffusion [5.3]. 
5.1 Uniqueness? 
A very important question is, should we struggle for a single worldview or for several worldviews?
At  first  sight,  one  might  be  afraid  of  a  single  worldview.  Why? We all  know the  dangers  of 
powerful worldviews, underlying totalitarianism or fanaticism, such as the communist or the Nazi 
ones.  Of  course,  it  is  very  important  to  analyse  the  complex  reasons  for  the  success  of  such 
worldviews at a particular time, but this is not the place to do that here. 
It is interesting to note that Marx claimed that his ideas were “scientific” (we will return to this 
question  of  "scientific  philosophy"  in  section  [6.2]).  Popper's  effort  toward  epistemology  was 
initially intended to show that Marx's philosophy and psychoanalysis were not sciences, as they 
claimed to be. So we should be very careful about applying worldviews uncritically. A key to do so 
is to make sure that the worldview remains open-minded, i.e. revisable. In short,  that it accepts 
values  of  criticism  or  open  discussion  which  are,  let  us  remember,  the  characteristics  of 
philosophical worldviews. 
Another fear is that if we all had the same worldview, it would imply that we would all think the 
same. This is of course a misunderstanding, since a worldview is more a guide, that gives very 
general recommendations: there can be very different roads to the same destination, thus leaving a 
lot of freedom of actions. 
For the time being, the danger is rather in worldview fragmentation than in uniqueness. Archie 
Bahm expressed it well: "the problems facing us today are more those of achieving greater unity, 
through a new complex organic synthesis, than of achieving more diversity" (Bahm 1979, 101). 
Thus, we can say that we aim for a unique worldview, but we should be careful not to claim that it 
is absolute. This dilemma is well expressed in (Apostel, Van der Veken 1991, 24): "we have learned 
to appreciate variety and multiformity as values, and hence we do not want to strive for one unique 
worldview. But neither do we want to resign ourselves to the present situation of fragmentation." 
On the other hand, what reasons can we find to argue for a unique worldview? 
First of all, we could say that if reality is one, and a worldview is an objective description of reality, 
then there can be only one sound worldview. We can immediately object that a worldview also 
contains  components  such as  values,  which are chosen,  and thus not  objective.  Still,  scientific 
progress leave us few choices for components (1), (2) , (3). 
A better  argument  is  that  a  homogeneous  society  has  fewer  conflicts  (Durkheim 1893).  Thus, 
sharing values and aims will reduce conflicts, and enable us to conduct more elaborated projects. In 
a human society, it is culture that plays this role, with the existence of common values or goals. 
In  spite  of  post-modern  emphasis  on  cultural  relativity,  it  can  be  argued  that  there  are  values 
common to all civilizations. As supported by empirical research about the factors determining what 
makes people happy (Heylighen, Bernheim 2000a), murder, theft, rape, lying, etc... are negative 
values in all societies, whereas health, wealth, friendship, honesty, safety, freedom, equality, etc... 
are positive ones. 
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Generally, a homogeneous system is easier to control (the word “control” has no negative 
connotation here, since it is a very general and central concept of system theory) and has fewer 
conflicts, because the elements have the same goals. Thus, less diversity is easier to control, but 
more diversity has the great advantage to allow more adaptability (Gershenson 2007). Thus, it 
seems that a trade-off between the two has to be found. Surely, an ideal worldview would be one 
with a great adaptability, so that it can face new unknown problems. 
To sum up, we can distinguish two levels. The first level is the one of the philosopher, seeking a 
single "best" worldview. What is important is to be open to criticisms and adapt the worldview to 
new knowledge or ideas. If we take the requirement of diversity too seriously, we will never be able 
to build an integrated worldview. The diversity will naturally remain because of the individual 
attempts of philosophers to build distinct worldviews and because of the constant critiques. If we 
reach and remain with a unique worldview, it will be a great achievement. But only then we will 
have to be particularly critical, and actively search for more diversity. 
The second level is the metalevel of comparisons of worldviews. History of philosophy functions at 
this metalevel, allowing a broader analysis of the evolution of different worldviews. Viewed from 
this level, having different worldviews is beneficial, because otherwise there would be nothing to 
compare! To conclude, we can say that we have to develop and maintain different worldviews only 
if they are equally powerful, i.e. if they answer as well the worldview questions, in a coherent and 
comprehensive  manner.  But  how precisely  are  we  to  evaluate  the  relative  quality  of  different 
worldviews? That is what we will investigate now. 
5.2 Worldview confrontation 
Why would we confront different worldviews? For example, it is often claimed that there is no 
contradiction between the religious and the scientific worldviews. This is incorrect since they give 
different  answers to the same questions,  although we have seen that  they preferentially  answer 
different sets of the worldview questions. We can confront different worldviews either to discredit 
one of them, or to argue for a new worldview (or both!). 
How  can  we  establish  that  one  worldview  is  better  than  another?
Any answer to a single worldview question will be open to criticism, often on strong grounds. Such 
automatic  criticism,  however,  may  result  in  a  relativistic,  sceptical  attitude  which  denies  the 
existence of an answer to such philosophical questions. 
But  let  us  challenge  the  sceptic,  and ask  him to  criticize  answers  given  to  all six  worldview 
questions. He would then have to discredit not only a philosophical proposition, but a philosophical 
system of thought. This entitles us to ask him for alternatives for the system he criticises. If he does 
not produce them, he is taking an easy position, eschewing his task as speculative philosopher. 
Moreover, he also has biases and an implicit worldview on which his criticisms are based. 
A philosophical worldview has to compete with any other worldview (sectarian, religious, scientific 
reductionistic, etc...) hopefully to be shown to be better in the end. 
5.2.1 Agree to disagree 
When we face a disagreement that has failed to be resolved by rational discussion, the next step to 
take is to  agree to disagree. This can be achieved by laying bare the traditions from which the 
different positions originate. This exposition of a philosophical  position can be done simply by 
answering the worldview questions. If two disagreeing philosophers follow this rule, most likely 
they will quickly uncover the source of the conflict. I do not mean that we have to maintain this 
situation, because this is simply acknowledging a contradiction, between two thinkers, but still a 
16
contradiction.  So,  both should wonder how to solve it,  either by changing their  position, or by 
refuting the opponent. 
5.2.2 Evaluation standards 
How can we evaluate philosophical theories? Rescher (2001, 31) proposed an interesting list  of 
evaluation standards. However, their presentation and organization can be improved. For example, I 
do not agree with the statement that "One philosophical theory/thesis is better than another when, 
other things being equal [...] It has a better fit to our prephilosophical knowledge in everyday life 
and in natural  science".  Should we really care much about our "prephilosophical  knowledge in 
everyday life"? Einstein's theory of relativity goes clearly against all our prephilosophical intuitions. 
But it has very important consequences for the knowledge of our Universe. So, a philosophical 
theory should foremost focus on fitting with natural sciences (see the next section). The question of 
our prephilosophical knowledge is secondary and is relevant only to the perspective of diffusion. 
The proposed categorisation according to presentational, evidential, and consequential merits could 
also be replaced by a better one. 
I therefore proposes to reorganise Rescher's evaluation standards on the basis of a short paper called 
Objective,  Subjective  and  Intersubjective  Selectors  of  Knowledge (Heylighen,  1997).  Further 
developing  the  thoughts  of  Donald  T.  Campbell,  the  paper  distinguishes  three  main classes  of 
criteria to select "fit" knowledge : 
(1) Objective criteria – selection for fit to the outside object.
(2) Subjective criteria – selection for acceptance by the individual subject.
(3) Intersubjective criteria – selection for sharing between subjects. 
With the help of these distinctions Rescher's (2001, 31) criteria can be organised more clearly: 
One philosophical worldview (system) is better than another one, when, other things being equal: 
1 It emphasizes objective criteria. 
1.1 It has a better fit with all the natural sciences. 
1.2 It addresses and adequately resolves a broader range of philosophical questions 
(especially the worldview questions). 
1.3 It exhibits greater internal and systemic coherence. It thus has fewer anomalies. 
2 It better fulfils intersubjective criteria. 
2.1 Its deliberations are less complex and its exposition is less complicated. 
2.2 It encourages a life-outlook that is socially more beneficial. 
3 It is easily adaptable to subjective criteria. 
3.1 It is simpler. It involves fewer distinctions and requires less elaborate explanations. 
Its principles are less artificial and contrived. 
3.2 Its lessons and implications for the conduct of life accord better with those of 
“common sense” experience. 
3.3 It encourages a life-outlook that is personally rewarding. 
This  list  is  ordered,  in  the  sense  that  the  objective  criteria  are  more  important  than  the 
intersubjective and the subjective ones. 
In our worldview framework, using our analogy [4.2] we can find at least the following parallels: 
(1.2) is completeness;  (1.3) coherence; (1.1) is essential  for the worldview components 1, 2, 3; 
(2.2), (3.2) (3.3) are expected for a good praxiology; (2.1), (3.1) are generally useful for diffusion 
(see the next section). Keeping in mind those criteria will definitely help us to choose between two 
speculative philosophical theories. 
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Popper (1958, 269) also gathered relevant questions to ask to a philosophical theory (i.e. a theory 
that is “non-empirical and irrefutable”). Let us quote him again, without any cut this time: 
In other words every rational theory, no matter whether scientific of philosophical, is rational in so far as 
it tries to solve certain problems. A theory is comprehensible and reasonable only in its relation to a given 
problem-situation,  and  it  can  be  rationally  discussed  only  by  discussing  this  relation.
Now if we look upon a theory as a proposed solution to a set of problems, then the theory immediately 
lends itself to critical discussion -even if it is non-empirical and irrefutable. For we can now ask questions 
such as, Does it solve the problem? Does it solve it better than other theories? Has it perhaps merely 
shifted the problem? Is the solution simple? Is it fruitful? Does it perhaps contradict other philosophical 
theories  needed  for  solving  other  problems?
Questions of this kind show that a critical discussion even of irrefutable theories may well be possible.
(Popper 1958, 269).
5.2.3 Application - science vs. religion 
We have already spoken about the limitations of both scientific and religious worldviews, the one in 
terms of incompleteness, the other in terms of incoherence. 
So, a fruitful open discussion between the two should ideally lead to either: 
(1) A religious worldview more compatible with scientific findings. 
(2) A scientific worldview completed with an axiology and a praxiology. 
Both, by their attempt to be more comprehensive and more coherent would then become 
philosophical worldviews. 
5.3 Worldview diffusion 
A worldview has the intention and the power to change our world —provided that it is diffused, 
accepted, and used. How are we to diffuse the worldview that we have constructed thanks to the 
previous guidelines? 
The 7th component reminds us that we cannot start from scratch. The philosopher Archie Bahm 
(1979,  100)  distinguished  two  steps  to  diffuse  a  worldview:  first,  to  reveal  presuppositions 
contributing to the present crises; second, to find presuppositions needed to recover from them. We 
thus have to analyse the present situation and the presently existing knowledge, and find ways, from 
those existing worldviews, to reach the new worldview. 
It is often said that religions provide concrete values. However, as we have shown, if we look a 
little bit closer at the religious texts, this turns out to be inaccurate. Plenty of contradictions and a 
variety of incompatible interpretations can be derived from the sacred texts. However, the social 
structure surrounding spiritual institutions (churches, temples, etc...) is there to welcome people and 
to help them solve their problems. This social structure supports the process of decision-making. In 
the same way, more philosophically oriented social structures could be developped.
Changing the moorings of people has to be done smoothly. Depending on the subject, it can take 
time -one generation or more- but in our world of accelerating change, this is not acceptable. Thus, 
we have to expect people to be more adaptive. When a worldview is proposed with the aim to 
convince, the statements should be clearly labelled as either strongly supported and consensual, or 
controversial and in debate. In its relation with the general public, the popularization of philosophy 
could  provide  a  simplified  (but  sound)  ready-made  worldview.  Remember  that  philosophy  is 
traditionally a truth-seeking enterprise, so it should still emphasize objective criteria (1), and to a 
lesser degree subjective (2) and intersubjective (3) ones. Contrary to other belief systems, curious 
minds would be most welcome to further investigate where the worldview comes from, what are the 
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issues at stake, what are the points most discussed, etc... But due to the complexity of the issues, to 
discuss them in detail would remain the professional philosopher's job. 
In  his  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason,  Kant  (1781)  brought  to  an  end  a  lot  of  metaphysical 
speculations. In a way, this is excellent, because it allowed science to develop independently of 
philosophical considerations, always with reference to sensible experience. Kant wanted peace in 
the  domain  of  pure  reason.  Yet,  in  the  context  of  the  quest  for  knowledge,  peace  is 
counterproductive. This quest needs precisely the opposite: the confrontation and war between ideas 
(and ideas only!); for “in philosophy, controversy is the life blood of the enterprise” (Rescher 2001, 
208). The worldview framework can be seen as a clear battlefield, where ideas can directly confront 
each others. Let the World-View-War (WVW) begin! 
6 First steps towards worldview construction
This section outlines partial  starting points to build an integrative philosophical  worldview. My 
approach is clearly more in the spirit of position 1c) described in introduction, that is, a philosophy 
that tries to view the cosmos and man together. 
What follows are first key principles providing more ways to filter the possible constructions of a 
philosophical worldview. Of course, building a satisfying worldview is a huge work; see e.g. the big 
traditional systematic treatises of philosophers, or browse through the hundreds of pages of the 
Principia  Cybernetica  Project worldview  (Joslyn,  Heylighen,Turchin,  1993). This  section  thus 
makes more philosophical choices than the previous sections. It will be more related to our present 
predicament, and to our present scientific knowledge. 
6.1 Failure of traditional worldviews 
We have already seen  that  the  understanding of  the  context  (our  problem-situation,  or  present 
predicament) is vital. What are the main worldviews in our time, and in what respects do they fail? 
Very briefly, here are some basic criticisms. The religious worldview has no rational mechanism to 
resolve issues or disagreements; it proposes few answers to contemporary developments, and thus is 
non-adaptive;  in  cases  of  doubt,  it  tends  to  fall  back  into  fundamentalism,  i.e.  the  literal 
interpretation of century-old Scripture. The traditional, reductionist scientific worldview maintains 
determinism, claiming that there is no purpose, and thus no meaning to life. Holistic worldviews 
(e.g.  "New Age")  tend  to  be  fuzzy,  irrational  and impractical.  A humanistic  worldview is  too 
anthropocentric:  it  should  seriously  consider  humankind  in  its  broader  context  (evolutionary, 
ecological, cosmological, etc...). It cannot deal with problems such as the so-called "singularity", 
which  suggests  that  humans  are  likely  to  disappear  and  be  replaced  intelligent  machines. 
Individualism is a value so widespread that it could be interpreted as a worldview. It is often viewed 
as the main problem of our society. On one side, it can mean a different worldview for each person, 
and thus, no shared worldview. This leads to the claim that no worldview is better than another one. 
In the limit, this implies no common values and thus no common goals (relativism). On the other 
side, an individualist worldview can mean a worldview with a very narrow scale: how to make the 
most of "my little daily life"—whatever that implies for others. John Stewart proposes methods to 
make us enlarge our worldviews with the help of evolutionary modelling capacities, thus producing 
broader outlooks and values (Stewart 2000, chap. 11, 12). 
6.2 Science first 
We introduced our paper by noting that science is increasingly taking over philosophy. Considering 
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the development of the sciences, this process is not going to slow down. Therefore, philosophy has 
to integrate as best as possible scientific results. 
A common, yet vain, attempt is to turn philosophy into a science (e.g. Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, 
Marx,  etc...).  Even  though  the  intention  to  make  philosophy  coherent  and  rigorous  is  to  be 
applauded, we have to be extremely sceptical  when we hear the phrase "scientific philosophy". 
Indeed,  scientific  findings  are  often  viewed  as  having  a  high  authority  which  then  would  be 
immediately  transfered  in  philosophy.  Archie  Bahm  speaks  about  the  different  sciences  of 
philosophy  (ethics,  etc...),  but  he  explicitly  means  a  general  scientific  and  rational  attitude. 
Unfortunately, it is often merely a trick used by philosophers to impose their philosophy, like in the 
example of Marx claiming that his dialectical materialism was a science. 
Instead,  we should  simply  ground philosophy in  science,  and be  inspired  by the  rigour  of  the 
scientific method. Broad (1958) noted that philosophy may be non-scientific, but is therefore not 
un-scientific: 
We must distinguish between being non-scientific and being un-scientific. What I have admitted is that 
philosophy is a subject which is almost certainly of its very nature non- scientific. We must not jump 
from this purely negative statement to the conclusion that it has the positive defect of being unscientific. 
The latter term can be properly used only when a subject, which is capable of scientific treatment, is 
treated in a way which ignores or conflicts with the principles of scientific method. (Broad 1958, 103)
Therefore, being coherent with major scientific results is not an option. For providing the widest 
synopsis, scientific results are unavoidable. We have to firmly and explicitly ground philosophy in 
science. We should take at the very least the most established scientific beliefs, and find ways to 
integrate them fully into our worldview. In such a philosophical worldview, it is a more serious 
defect  to  ignore  important  scientific  results  than  to  extrapolate  them  in  order  to  solve  other 
philosophical problems. 
Such a worldview must be ready to be revised as science advances. If a scientific theory is refuted, 
it  should  be  clear  that  philosophical  consequences  would  have  to  be  taken  into  account.  This 
approach  would  limit  purely  intellectual  philosophical  constructions  by  keeping  philosophical 
theories up to date with respect to scientific theories. 
A common pitfall in philosophy is to delight  in a conceptual world, without any connection to 
reality, i.e. rely on internal coherence alone. But any claim of a worldview should be able to be 
connected  somehow  to  our  concrete  world,  i.e.  there  must  also  be  external  coherence.  A 
philosophical claim would then be explicitly linked more or less closely to facts, often through 
scientific theories. Concretely, a criterion for a good systematic philosophy would be a philosophy 
having links to at least the whole of well-established scientific knowledge; or even better, to the 
whole of human knowledge. 
6.2.1 A universal language for sciences. 
Curt Ducasse (1941, chap. 1) criticized the statement that "philosophy is more general than science" 
by noting that  the philosopher  does not make explicit  the links between the different  sciences. 
However, this is not true anymore. For the complexity sciences constitute precisely this bridging 
science.  For  example,  some general  concepts  like feedback or  self-organization can be applied 
equally well  in physics,  chemistry, biology,  psychology, sociology...  General system theory and 
cybernetics aim to propose a universal language for the sciences (e.g. (von Bertalanfy 1968)). We 
can thus expect fruitful cooperation of philosophy with those sciences of complexity. 
We  will  not  further  develop  the  importance  of  striving  towards  a  philosophical  system,  since 
Rescher (2001) already forcefully argued in that direction. Here is a summary of his position: 
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Our preface for simplicity, uniformity, and systematicity in general, is now not a matter of a substantive 
theory regarding the nature of the world, but one of search strategy - of cognitive methodology. In sum, 
we opt  for  simplicity  (and systematicity  in  general)  in  inquiry  not  because it  is  truth-indicative,  but 
because it is teleologically more effective in conducing to the efficient realization of the goals of inquiry. 
(Rescher 2001, 202).
6.2.2 No single person 
A widespread adage about today's knowledge is that "no single person can handle its full extent 
anymore". This seems to imply humility and an appeal to restrict ourselves to just a small subject 
domain. Although the explosion of knowledge is a fact, here are some arguments and keys to react 
against this annoying situation. 
First, as we have just said, system theory offers us such general concepts that they can apply to all 
the different sciences. Thus, if we master those concepts, we have keys to access all the scientific 
knowledge, not in their specific and incompressible details, but at least in their main principles. 
Second, building a worldview is a huge philosophical enterprise. As with big scientific projects, we 
would certainly  need more  collaboration  between philosophers.  We thus need to  have  a  better 
organization  to  handle  this  information  overload,  individually  and  collectively.  Information 
technologies, such as emails, search engines, databases, are nowadays indispensables tools for the 
researcher. 
6.3 Ambition and caution 
Philosophy faces the following problem: the more interesting the questions are, the less we can be 
demanding about the answers. For example, we can have a perfectly precise answer to the question 
"How much is 5+7 in Peano's arithmetic?"; but a much less definite one to "Does God exist?". So, if 
we try to answer this second kind of questions, we cannot expect definitive answers. The most 
rational way to answer is probably by aiming at what we have called a complete and coherent 
philosophical worldview.
The further we are from "facts", the more cautious we need to be. Therefore, philosophers should be 
much more careful than scientists. We claimed that both analytical and continental philosophy lack 
ambition. However, we should be careful with ambition, as it can lead to dogmatism. I would like to 
put forward the following maxim: 
The more ambition in the questions, the more caution with the answers. 
Philosophers must remain ambitious in their goals, but proportionately cautious in the weight they 
give  to  their  solutions.  Indeed,  it  is  precisely  this  ambition  to  answer  age-old  questions  that 
stimulates philosophy. However, philosophers should be modest in the assurance of their system, 
because their systems are by construction fragile. 
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7 Conclusion 
Starting a philosophy can be as simple as starting to answer rationally the worldview questions. 
Then, we can search for the interrelations between the components. The answers to the different 
questions will inevitably be in conflict with each other; but again, this is the motive of philosophical 
activity! The answers are likely to be very naive at the beginning, but we can step by step affine 
them, by pointing out the contradictions and insufficiencies, and focusing on these to find ways to 
solve or complete them. The author thus suggests a pragmatic approach. If we wait until we find a 
supposed "Truth" or an "Absolute" before answering the questions, we might well wait forever. 
Here is a summary of the steps necessary to build a philosophical worldview. 
1. Make a synoptic review of everything that could be useful to answer the worldview 
questions. 
2. Choose or create the best concepts to make a synthesis out of this synopsis. 
3. Propose a synthesis, in the form of a systematic philosophy. 
4. Confront the resulting worldview to show why it is a better worldview than the others that 
exist. 
5. Show how it can solve the problems of our time. 
6. Diffuse your worldview. 
Because of its lack of ambition, present-day philosophy rarely proposes -or even aims to propose- a 
coherent and comprehensive worldview. We hope to have provided the first sketch for a method 
which keeps the classical ambition of philosophy, but with an even greater caution in trying to 
realize this ambition. 
This worldview approach has the advantage of being in harmony with the origin of philosophy and 
with its traditional domains. It provides clear goals for philosophers. Let this paper announce a 
rebirth of speculative philosophy, or worldview construction, in a cautious and clear framework. 
Paraphrasing a well-known philosopher of Königsberg, the spirit of this paper can be epitomized in 
the maxim: 
Speculative philosophies without content are void;
critical philosophies without synoptic conceptions, blind. 
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